a new study finds that the average of two of someone's guesses is more accurate than the first or second guess alone. the authors posit that we draw from an internal probability distribution instead of having one best guess. further research could help us make a better estimates, critical for professions such as medicine and the military.

this indicates that the "wisdom of crowds" idea, roughly that averaging a crowd's answers is better than asking one person, applies to individuals as well. as surowiecki notes, this has many caveats. however, scienceblogs is curiously attempting to falsify it using this guessing study.

how is that? well, they erroneously claim that under w-o-c each person must give stable answers over time, their "best guess." they then misinterpret this guessing study to say that second guesses were more accurate (the study clearly states the reverse). ergo, w-o-c is false because people don't give best guesses first.

rather, this study may bolster woc: even though people are possibly drawing from some internal distribution of answers, the woc effect persists. this study simply illustrates the benefits of "benefits from polling the 'crowd' within" when making your own estimates, leaving the idea of polling from the crowd outside to stand on its own merit.

Labels: decision making

the other day at lunch, visitors from new york city proclaimed how safe their city is. new york city safe? apparently. and if we look at the statistics, new york city has a paltry per capita murder rate of 7.3. nyc doesn't even make it into the top 25, 30, or even 40. omaha and indanapolis rank far higher; even the "sunshine city" of st. petersburg florida comes in well above nyc.

why does this ranking seem so wrong? perhaps because it is. as someone pointed out at lunch, this is the per capita rate. although your probability of getting shot in new york is much less according to the per capita rate, it would be much higher than sprawling indianapolis using a per mile rate. that is because new york is very small; all those murders are concentrated on a tiny island.

i don't advocate always living life by statistics. however, if i am going to think about statistics, they'd better be the right ones. when i walked outside, i would ask myself: what is the probability of someone getting shot on this block right now? that is per mile rate, not the per capita rate (and neighborhood, time of day, etc. rates).

in conclusion, nyc may be safer than it used to be. but you'll still have to carry your mace on your next visit.

Labels: decision making

the old and the young utilize different mechanisms to evaluate alternatives:

"This pattern suggests that younger and older adults' comparison processes are influenced by different goals," she said. "Even when older adults show little or no signs of cognitive decline, they make decisions differently than younger adults, in ways that should help them avoid regret."

Labels: decision making, well being

it seems a natural conclusion from the theory of temporal discounting is that individuals that expect to die soon should have high discount rates. that is, people in poor health will want things now, as opposed to in the future, even if the benifit now is slightly smaller. afterall, they may die before getting the future reward.

a new working paper suggests this is the case, but with a twist. they found high discount rates in the sick, but also in the very healthy. this is how they explain the high discount rate for health individuals:

according to Trostel & Taylor (2002) and Olsho (2006), the ability to enjoy consumption depends on an individual’s health, and the healthier an individual, the greater the enjoyment of the same commodity bundle. Because health generally declines over the life cycle, individuals should have a high subjective discount rate when healthy and, thus, enjoy the consumption while they still can.

also interesting, age was found to be significant for discount rate, but only until health was entered into the regression.

it's worth a read, although there are problems with the study such biased sample selection (mostly younger business owners).

related post on neural correlates of discounting

Labels: decision making, economics

It may be said that pure abstinence, being a mere negation, cannot produce positive effects; the same remark might as well be applied to intrepidity, or even to liberty; but who ever objected to their being considered as equivalent to active agents? To abstain from the enjoyment which is in our power, or to seek distant rather than immediate results, are among the most painful exertions of the human will. It is true that such exertions are made, and indeed are frequent in every state of society, except perhaps in the very lowest, and have been made in the very lowest, for society could not otherwise have improved; but of all the means by which man can be raised in the scale of being, abstinence, as it is perhaps the most effective, is the slowest in its increase, and the least generally diffused -- Nassau W. Senior

from decision science news archives.

Labels: decision making, well being

many people are already familiar with some of the psychological tricks casinos use to get more of their money, such as not having clocks and super-oxygenating the air. in turn, motley fool has some good tips for curbing those negative gambling habits, however encouraged, both at the poker table and elsewhere.

it's interesting, then, that more casinos haven't gone smoke-free in their effort to get people to stick around. no-smoke.org lists only a handful of non-smoking casinos and (snicker) bingo parlors (PDF).

i suppose this suggests evidence for the point that smoke doesn't significantly effect consumer decisions, as las vegas has probably invested plenty of research into what does. one must ask: if the public does prefer smokeless casinos , why don't they demand them? i'm sure there are many reasons. my inner statistician (demographer?) suggests (as i'm sure many others have done) that the gambling subpopulation's preferences differ substantially from the aggregate population's. folks bothered by smoke may be the minority in gambling groups but the majority in the general population. this may make sense because of general gambling culture and because gambling folks probably have higher incidence of risk-taking & addictive personalities. yet on top of paternalistic concerns, the aggregate population can probably imagine going to a casino so still have a self-interest in regulating the smoke-free casino game.

update: on a similar note, "brothels ask exemption from smoking ban"

Labels: decision making, political

some stereotypes of the average left and right american seem to hold up. a new survey of voter personality suggests that the average center-left voter is friendlier and more benevolent, cooperative, polite, and open. the center-right voter is more secure, energetic, traditional, and conscientious.

of course, it is unclear whether such traits and values make one more likely to be a liberal or conservative, or whether "membership" in an ideological community or thinking about the logical consequences of one's ideology bends personality over time (a la cognitive dissonance perhaps?). to answer this question, we'd have to discover which came first, personality or ideology, or if they are reciprocally influential.

the statistical significance* of these results implies that there is such a thing as one true "liberal" and "conservative," casting doubt on the idea of at least one kind of diversity in political parties. in fact, a new study by dan klein (PDF) surveyed a large group of academics on voting behavior and policy issues. results indicate that policy preference among conservatives is rather diverse, with wide-ranging views on tariffs, drug controls, marriage, etc. however, modern liberalism was not such a big tent philosophy. liberal academics, it turns out, give nearly the same response to most policy questions.

so given the results of klein's study in light of this new one, it may be that traits and values commonly held by liberals lend themselves more readily to interpreting policy in one particular way. that is, their personality characteristics are a more useful or universal "lens" through which to interpret societal ideas.

then are conservative decisions based on more rational calculations? conservatives should not toot their horns too soon, as recent evidence suggests that most individuals, regardless of ideology, make their policy decisions based on emotion rather than rational thought. so perhaps conservative values and traits are just less relevant to the political world (which may make sense looking at the traits; i don't think this kind of "energetic" has anything to do with enron).

*interestingly, emotional stability was not strongly correlated with either voting pattern. :)

Labels: decision making, ideology, political

via decision science news:

To abstain from the enjoyment which is in our power, or to seek distant rather than immediate results, are among the most painful exertions of the human will. It is true that such exertions are made, and indeed are frequent in every state of society, except perhaps in the very lowest, and have been made in the very lowest, for society could not otherwise have improved....

Labels: decision making

a new study suggests that political decision making and analytical thinking may be opposed, illustrating the neural substrates of confirmation bias (tendency to ignore facts opposing your view and seek those confirming it).

in the study, staunch political party members evaluated data critical of their candidate - george w or john kerry's - position on an issue. brain scans revealed no activity in areas of conscious analytical thought, but instead in emotional circuits including conflict and disgust. reward centers took over when subjects came to their decisions.

we are a jaded polity; most of us (justly) feel that politicians manipulate facts. i'm not sure the study says much more than that. once someone's convinced, by whatever method, that her party or candidate is usually correct, that trust makes her likely to be skeptical of any information contradicting the party tract. it's energy and time efficient; it's farming out work to an institution you trust.

so does this say something horrible about us? should we feel guilty for not being analytical enough? not necessarily. at most, it illustrates one of the dangers of direct democracy. perhaps we aren't really cut out to make decisions for everyone.

unfortunately, the study did not look at independent or swing voters, or even party folks who are less involved. i'd also like to see if brain activity differs between issues of greater or lesser personal and worldwide importance, and unfamiliar issues.

thanks to tenacious jdt for the link.

Labels: decision making, ideology

i've been seeing more and more research on behavioral gender differences lately. i love it; it's both interesting and fabulously politically incorrect.

it makes sense that we derive enjoyment from seeing our enemies suffer. however, a new study suggests that men enjoy watching their enemies suffer more than women do. this could help explain a host of behavioral gender differences, as men may be facing different neural trade-offs. now i want to see a study that measures whether or not men are more willing to "pay" to punish unfair trades in the lab - i'll wager they do.

see other posts gender differences in intelligence, performance on standardized tests, and pain, and the biological mechanism for some gender differences.

ref: Tania Singer, Ben Seymour, John P. O'Doherty, Klaas E. Stephan, Raymond J. Dolan and Chris D. Frith. "Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others." Nature Jan. 18 2006

Labels: decision making

extreme makeover ruins lives! and it's globalization's fault! or, at least according to a new book intriguingly entitled the new individualism (no, not that new individualism). and i quote:

the craze for television makeover shows on gardening, plastic surgery and clothing is partly responsible for a dangerous addiction to reinvention that can ruin lives

reality shows convince viewers that they should improve themselves, creating "disposable identities" and impossible expectations. worse still, globalization creates the fast-paced and fluid economy that demands immediate, impossible, change. elliott and lemert warn this pressure leads to "emotional crisis, depression, confusion, breakdown, loss of personal identity and even suicide."

this dark forecast is contradicted by a study published in 2002 by the american psychologist. the study, by jeffrey arnett, suggests that "new individualism's" underlying force may be positive:

identity becomes less based less on prescribed social roles and more on individual choices, on decisions that each person makes about what values to embrace and what paths to pursue in love and work.

arnett poses three reactions to this choice: identity confusion, seeking refuge in a structured subculture, or open embrace of the decision. most embrace their ability to pick-and-choose, and arnett sees this as not deleterious, but as increasing the likelihood that "they will find a psychologically rewarding match between these choices and their individual desires and abilities."

this all goes back to the tired choice crap: to choose, or to not have a choice? that is the question. psychologists can debate, but i know i'd rather suffer through the agony of selecting a perfectly fitting jeans, or a much cuter nose, than be without. the real question is, would i be just as happy with ill-fitting jeans if i didn't know the perfect ones existed? no, by definition; i'd be uncomfortable.

Labels: decision making, well being

for those who don't believe in evolution, here's some good evidence of its mechanism:

Joe McGee stands in the pounding surf at the Southern Most Point in Key West, Fla. Tuesday, Sept. 20, 2005, as Hurricane Rita neared the lower Florida Keys. (AP)

this reminds me of people who rushed to mount saint helens last year when everyone thought it may blow its top. the motivations for rushing to the scene of a potential natural disaster are a bit different than what is going on here, though. here people are staying in their homes, and the disaster is coming to them. risk judgments are involved in both cases, but in the latter other factors such as previous hurricane experience and overestimation of home construction play a role. in some situations, one could see overconfidence and flawed self-assessment as adaptive traits, helping individuals perform better. however, flawed assessment of one's ability to weather a storm is fatally dangerous, as we've seen with katrina or any number of other decisions (e.g., overestimating your body and making the decision to continue smoking).

it's also interesting to note that when forced to make decisions based solely on experience and memory people typically make much riskier decisions than when presented with written materials. this is not particularly surprising. and hurricane folks certainly aren't basing their decisions off of hurricane evacuation manuals. life insurance companies would do well to mail those to their costal clientele.

aside: rita is a truly terrible name. homes in houston deserve better.

update: just fixing the picture

Labels: decision making, social

british researchers have found no correlation between IQ and self-reported life satisfaction as one ages. the longitudinal study, which measured IQ at 11 and 79 years old, asked participants about both their current life satisfaction and regrets.

notwithstanding flaws with self-report data, this indicates that as a senior, IQ may do little to enhance satisfaction. this makes sense as, i imagine, IQ isn't related to health or companionship, more prominent factors in senior satisfaction.

importantly, it also shows that IQ is unrelated to one's satisfaction with her life decisions. the study posits that IQ must be unrelated, then, to good and bad decisions in life. although this rings true to some extent from my experience, as i know a lot of "smart" people who make very bad decisions, it may not be the full answer. perhaps people with lower IQs make more bad decisions, but are unable to recognize them or envision better alternatives for comparison.

a significant problem with this study - that i'm surprised the journal article didn't mention - is attrition, as people with lower IQs die earlier.

so does this mean that the tables are leveled? not necessarily. many psychologists believe that there are several types of intelligence, and that IQ measures only one. it's still unclear how other kinds relate to life satisfaction.

hat tip to world of psychology.

reference: alan j gow, martha c whiteman, alison pattie, lawrence whalley, john starr, and ian j deary. lifetime intellectual function and satisfaction with life in old age: longitudinal cohort study. british medical journal , jul 2005; 331: 141 - 142

Labels: decision making, well being

being brain-damaged may not be so bad after all. in a study from this month's psychological science, participants with focal lesions in emotion centers made better decisions when presented with risky investment tasks. the emotional brain has been chided for making myopic, risky decisions, but here it seems it’s the unemotional brain taking all the risks, and for the better.

the task at hand was a positive-expected-value investment game, which means that benefits outweigh the costs of playing. even though rationally it made more sense to bet, normal and control patients became more conservative with each round. in contrast, lesioned participants bet at approximately the same risk level throughout. as the risk of loosing was low, "risky" decisions paid off, and lesioned participants made off with more winnings.

because most dilemmas are not positive-expected-value, and have more ambiguous elements, this study lacks immediate practical application. emotions can play a valuable role in many decision-making processes, particularly where ambiguity is involved. however, it is important to note when emotion is a good, or bad, guide for decisions - something this study helps to do.

source: baba shiv et al."investment behavior and the negative side of emotion." psychological science june 2005.

Labels: decision making, neuroscience

researchers have found – if simultaneous fMRI scans are to be believed – the “trust” center of the brain:

With the development of trusting feelings, increased blood flow occurred in the caudate nucleus, an area in the rear portion of the brain that is involved in processing rewards. Over time, this increased blood flow appeared earlier as an expectation of trustworthiness was established.

the study was pretty cool. two participants were wired for fMRI and began a trading game that's pretty standard in experimental economics. the “investor” could give her partner money, which would then triple. the partner could then give some of that money back, a method that would create trust in the investor to continue to send money.

with the recognition that social interactions are rarely single-shot, and that trust cannot develop without prior experience, 10 rounds were played. at first, the caudate nucleus lit up when participants knew how much the other was giving them. towards the end - after seven or eight rounds - its neurons began popping even before participants knew whether or not their partner was giving them money at all, indicating that participants are building a model of the investor's next move. that was indeed the case, an additional experiment revealed, when the partner was able to guess more and more accurately what the investor would do over time. this is, essentially, the neuroscience of reputation building.

the caudate nucleus, whose disorder is implicated in such disorders as ADHD, obsessive-compulsive disorder, schizophrenia, parkinson's, and huntington's disease, is part of the striatum, which is one of the basal ganglia, situated kind of in the middle of the brain between the two hemispheres. in this experiment researchers concluded that it handles information regarding the "fairness" of the investor's decision as well as the decision to repay that fairness with trust.

reference: getting to know you: reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange
brooks king-casas, damon tomlin, cedric anen, colin f. camerer, steven r. quartz, and p. read montague science 1 april 2005; 308: 78-83 [DOI:10.1126/science.1108062]

Labels: decision making, neuroscience

involuntary committal is a contentious subject in mental health. recently i came across a story that nicely highlights its danger. this situation's extreme nature serves as a reminder that health professionals are just as likely to abuse power as anyone else:

A Longboat Key psychologist has been sentenced to ten weekends in jail for lying on forms to involuntarily commit a griping neighbor who later died. Holli Bodner had a yearlong feud with Jean Pierre Villar about street lights and dog poop before committing him to a mental health center in April 2003.

psychiatric hospitals are often frightening and dehumanizing places. they are similar to jails and should be taken seriously. if we must involuntarily commit, lawmakers should narrowly designate who should receive that onerous power or restructure the sentencing rules to allow more objective sentencing. even criminals get a trial by elected official, whereas the mentally "ill" are often "jailed" without due process.

actually, it is not clear to me that we must involuntarily commit at all. if we take seriously the concept of self-ownership (a dubious assumption), only those who willingly choose to enter such facilities, or those ordered by courts in lieu of or along with criminal punishment, would do so. even those individuals presenting a threat to or actually harming themselves could not be committed, as with total self-ownership comes the right to destroy one's property.

the rest of the cases would involve a citizen or official's feeling that the individual poses a threat to others. i've mentioned earlier that it's very dangerous to make legal decisions on grounds as subjective as feelings, but in addition this preemptive condition means we're jailing people who have done nothing wrong but instead look like they someday might. law has dealt with cases such as these before, in particular as regards stalking and threats of homicide. it is not clear to me why we should handle the mentally "ill" differently, except in their treatment if convicted.

Labels: decision making, misc. psych

the new scientist writes on ernst fehr's research suggesting that altruism is actually inborn. this is a terribly interesting and controversial vein of research that investigates fascinating aspects of human behavior, including that we seem to have a set idea of what is "fair" and a willingness to punish the unfair even at a cost.

the article questions how altruism fits in with evolutionary psychology - why would we punish others for not being altruistic if it hurt us? one, um, interesting take:

One possibility, Trivers suggests, is that evolution actually is wiping these people out - it just hasn't finished the job yet. ... it is the benefits we gained from reciprocal altruism in our evolutionary past that lead us to behave with "inappropriate" altruism in experiments like Fehr's, Trivers says.

not everyone agrees with trivers' theory, and the article cites studies indicating that cooperation, which involves punishment of those not cooperating, was an important social goal in ancestral life, so:

...true altruism, far from being a maladaptation, may be the key to our species' success by providing the social glue that allowed our ancestors to form strong, resilient groups. It is still crucial for social cohesion in today's very different world. "Something like it had to evolve," Gintis says.

more on this research.

via (i think?) a & l daily.

Labels: decision making

in his new book blink, malcom gladwell writes:

...even the most complicated of relationships and problems have an identifiable pattern. ...overloading the decision makers with information makes picking up that signature harder, not easer. To be a successful decision maker, we have to edit.

this reminds me of a a study i read last month (pdf) in psychological science that hints at why we're so bad at decisions involving too much information. researchers at the university of queensland handed a group of academics information on the interaction between variables, and asked them to make a judgment requiring synthesis of the relationships.

synthesizing three variables was difficult, and more left the academics dumfounded:

“At the level of the four-way interactions, participants made comments such as “Everything fell apart and I had to go back”,” Professor Halford said.

a fashionable critique of the market is that it provides too much choice - i.e., too many variables to consider. consumers can become overwhelmed, and barry schwartz's book paradox of choice claims this leads to "bad decisions, to anxiety, stress, and dissatisfaction - even to clinical depression."

although by no means a scholarly work, gladwell's book is important in highlighting the counterintuitive observation that economizing is key in decision making, and it seems that process can alleviate some of the supposed psychological harms of the market. halford et. al have told us exactly how far we should go with the information we do use.

from all this we know we must economize, and by how much. now we need someone to tell us how to determine which variables to include in our analyses. i'm inclined to say that reviews are key here. for example, when purchasing a car i can test drive every car on the market and keep accurate record of my observations. my working memory will then overload and my mind will "drop" all of my mental bundles, leaving me tired, frustrated, and confused. a smarter option would be to pick up consumer reports and car & driver. they have done some of the filtering for me, and i can instead focus on a few key criteria.

the ironic part for market critics is that these filtering mechanisms are demanded by consumers, and provided via the free market, to help ameliorate the harms they critique.

[the tile of this post is derived from a quote by military genius paul van riper: "in the act of tearing something apart, you lose its meaning."]

reference: halford, gs, rosemary, b, mccredden, je, and bain, jd. "how many variables can humans process?" psychological science, january 2005

Labels: decision making, well being

ny times magazine reviews the book "overconfidence and war" this week. author dominic johnson questions why leaders are often overconfident in their nation's warring capabilities. overconfidence in battle served the evolutionary purpose of scaring one's opponent into submission.

Military overconfidence, in other words, is a psychological holdover -- a cognitive appendix -- from an earlier period in human history. It is perhaps most dangerous when it prompts a decision for war in the first place.

overconfidence has been rendered obsolete by modern technology and bureaucracy, johnson argues. one doesn't intimidate opponents with a strong battle cry anymore. but my favorite line is this:

[A] cocky disposition is as likely to be suicidal as it is glorious.

that might be as true in war as it is in peace.

Labels: decision making

the wsj this morning had an interesting article about the racism debate – is it an inevitable human attribute? some evolutionary psychologists claim it is hardwired - ancestors wary of outside tribes weren’t killed as often, so the “us vs. them” response was passed on to descendants. this may or may not be true, and is nearly impossible to prove. the more interesting question addressed in the article is about the “true you”

in implicit studies, where participants must react before they are able to control their innate responses, we’re all supposedly racist and sexist. however, in a new study when participants were able to look at faces for 500 miliseconds longer than in other studies, no such implicit reaction occurred, and the brain response is even different, utilizing newer and more cognitively complex brain areas (frontal cortex as opposed to amygdala). since in life, we rarely have to make 30 millisecond decisions, i’m not sure it matters that these responses do occur. and who’s to say those 30 millisecond responses are really more “us” than the frontal cortex and anterior cingulate responses?

Prof. Cunningham demurs: “It’s silly to say that these automatic reactions are the true you.” or that they are any more “you” than thoughtful reactions that reflect consciousness and beliefs”

of note, i recall that when one's frontal cortex is damaged, the person becomes "soulless," losing his/her personality altogether... so perhaps the frontal cortex is more "you" than those more primitive areas.

look for cunningham's article in the upcoming issue of psychological science. i've begun the in-press article and must say it's fascinating.

as an aside, earlier i tested my own implicit reactions, and they do exist. somehow i'm not too worried.

reference: "Racism Studies Find Rational Part of Brain Can Override Prejudice" by Sharon Begley, WSJ, 11/19/2004, B1

Labels: decision making, neuroscience

via world of psychology:

Researchers at the University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University, Harvard University and Princeton University found two areas of the brain that appear to compete for control over behavior when a person attempts to balance near-term rewards with long-term goals. The research involved imaging people’s brains as they made choices between small but immediate rewards or larger rewards that they would receive later.

after reading further, this once again becomes a struggle between emotion and rationality:

"Our emotional brain has a hard time imagining the future, even though our logical brain clearly sees the future consequences of our current actions," Laibson said. "Our emotional brain wants to max out the credit card, order dessert and smoke a cigarette. Our logical brain knows we should save for retirement, go for a jog and quit smoking. To understand why we feel internally conflicted, it will help to know how myopic and forward-looking brain systems value rewards and how these systems talk to one another."

first, discounting the future can be seen as quite rational, and really makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint. back in the day, we were trained to take every opportunity as it presented itself. the future is uncertain, and nature holds no promise of $11 tomorrow instead of $10 today. in addition, in a modern sense discounting the future is rational again because we still don't know what that future will bring. if i choose one scoop of ice cream today instead of two tomorrow, it makes sense. not only am i not sure if tomorrow will provide an even better opportunity - maybe i'll get three scoops for some reason tomorrow, but i am also not sure if i'll even be around to take that opportunity. i could have a massive coronary (unrelated to my massive ice cream consumption, of course) and die, therefore not not ever enjoying any ice cream at all.

scientifically speaking:

The study showed that decisions involving the possibility of immediate reward activated parts of the brain influenced heavily by brain systems that are associated with emotion. In contrast, all the decisions the students made — whether short- or long-term — activated brain systems that are associated with abstract reasoning.

those choosing the delayed reward showed stronger activation in their abstract reasoning systems. i'm assuming they're speaking of the insular cortex, which has been implicated in that role before. i've also noted before that the insular cortex is related to more than just emotion.

Labels: decision making, neuroscience

from the ap:

Thousands of tourists spent hours gazing at Mount St. Helens, packing buildings, crowding parking lots and watching from roadsides to see what the rumbling mountain would do next.
While scientists kept a watchful eye on the volcano, throngs of curious onlookers filled the mountain's visitor centers. Others sat outside in lawn chairs, sipping coffee, determined to witness the next eruption.

so... what's going on here? a volcano, whose last major eruption killed nearly sixty people, is spewing ash and smoke. instead of running for their lives, people are flocking to the site. these strange tourists could value the emotional high they get from being on the precipice of a major catastrophe more than their safety. i'd wager a lot of them have the "thrill seeking gene" and a lot more are ego-driven, wanting that “i was there when...” trophy.
more on risk and choice

update: watch mt. st. helen's from the safety of your home.

Labels: decision making, social

one of the american psychological association (APA)’s monthly publications, monitor on psychology, reports this month on a recent – and somehow surprising – research finding from carnegie mellon university:

"The research shows that… people are capable of understanding risks and making decisions in their best interest"

this result is in the context of subjects’ assessment of sexual, vaccination, and terrorist threat risks, and flies in the face of current psychology dogma and other recent research, but only kind of. the one caveat to their finding is that people can only make these "rational" decisions when given full and unbiased information. another recent study shows that when people receive written information they tend to make more cautious decisions. however, when given only partial information, people tend to realize they’re trying to be persuaded and disregard all information from that source altogether.
charts, graphs, and anecdotal stories all are effective ways of communicating decision-making information. research points to the importance of anecdotes particularly, likely because of their emotional appeal. and when authorities don’t know the risk (e.g., the safety of flying on an airline directly after 9/11), they should admit it:

…government spokespeople should admit that they simply do not know what the risk is…. Research shows that the public is unlikely to panic, unless they lose faith in their own authorities….

this is heartening information i hope the government heeds: instead of feeding us propagandistic public service announcements, mandatory programs, etc., opting for a more unbiased approach yields better results. what a disaster that would be for prohibition.

Labels: decision making

next time you're making a critical decision, try to work yourself up into a really foul mood (from Yahoo! News):

"A positive mood is likely to trigger less careful thinking strategies,' Professor Joseph Forgas said in a prepared statement. He said the findings make evolutionary sense. 'This supports the idea that mood states are evolutionary signals about how to deal with threatening situations. That is, a negative mood state triggers more systematic, more attentive, more vigilant information processing,' Forgas said.

studies indicate that depressed individuals tend to see the world - and themselves - in a more realistic light, whereas happy folks tend to have inflated ideas of themselves and unrealistically optimistic views of the world around them. a negative mood perhaps works in the same way to not only allow better critical thinking skills, but also to assess the situation more accurately to begin with.

via amanda brand

Labels: decision making

from yahoo! news:

"The new study chips 'yet another sliver from the rational model of economic man,' said Stanford University psychologist Brian Knutson, who reviewed the Swiss research. 'Instead of cold, calculated reason, it is passion that may plant the seeds of revenge,' he said.
People often are eager to punish wrongdoers even if the revenge brings them no personal gain or actually costs them something. From a practical standpoint, that may seem irrational. "

feeling good is not irrational, even from a practical standpoint. i've proposed before that our brains might unconsciously weigh the costs and benefits of our actions, even where emotions are involved, factoring emotional costs and benefits into the equation as well. the "high" we get from revenge may outweigh any harm we anticipate from the event, although whether we foresee that correctly is another story. the study's findings suggest this as well:

When the retaliation cost them money, a second brain region that helps weigh costs and benefits got involved, too, but the striatum remained key. The level of activity actually predicted which players would spend more money to get revenge.

the striatum is involved in enjoyment and satisfaction, and the article states that it's activation indicates "satisfaction from anticipating it [revenge]". so the more you predict that you'll be emotionally satisfied by revenge, the more likely you are to actually seek it. seems rational to me.

read the whole journal article: Quervain, D, Fischbacher, U, Treyer, V, Schellhammer, N, Schnyder, U, Buck, A, Fehr, E. The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, Science, Vol 305, Issue 5688, 1254-1258 , 27 August 2004.

hat-tip: "magic" amanda brand

Labels: decision making, neuroscience

the other day a friend posed the question: if you could test for an illness you knew would kill you later in life, would you choose to take the test or live in ignorance? the response was overwhelmingly for the latter option. i held the dissenting opinion. i’d rather know so i could live my life to the fullest. a recent study may back up my decision.

through genetic testing women can discover a genetic mutation that can lead to certain types of cancer including breast and ovarian. researchers at georgetown wondered how this test impacted happiness, so they followed a group of women for six months after they were tested for the mutation. the results showed that those who tested negatively were, as one would predict, happier afterwards. the surprising result is that those who tested positive for the mutation were not affected either way – they felt the same as before the test was administered.
an interesting result is that those who test negative can have significant guilt that they escaped somehow but their relatives did not, a phenomenon we also see when people survive traumatic incidents.

from psychology today

Labels: decision making, well being

in my implosive post a few days back, i mentioned the quandary of how accurately people are able to judge the outcomes of their decisions and that it should be the subject of it’s own post. well, i just finished an article in the journal psychological science that speaks to this and so today is the day.
the researchers compare two different resources we use to gather information for decision making, experience and written guides (brochures, books, etc.). subjects using written guides tend to make cautious decisions, oftentimes overweighing the probability of rare outcomes.
when using only experience, as we are often required to do, subjects made riskier decisions, underweighting the likelihood of rare events. rare events are, well, rare, and therefore less likely to be at the forefront of our minds unless the event just occurred, which is unlikely. therefore, we tend to make decisions from experience underweighting the probability of those rare events because they are literally the furthest thing from our mind, a phenomenon called the recency effect.
in life unpleasant outcomes are often rare. it isn’t every day we’re hit by a car when carelessly walking across the street. it makes sense then for us to underestimate negative outcomes if going just off of experience. are then our decisions less rational because we are not taking into account in the proper proportions the likelihood of certain events? it seems to me that this phenomenon, although unconscious, is rational. we should undervalue those rare events and free ourselves to receive the benefits of doing things we otherwise would not do.

i have recent experience with this phenomenon: i undervalued the probability that a car would be driving behind me as i was backing out of my parking space, prompting me to be careless, gun it, and smash in the side of a lawyer’s lexus. where usually the recency effect allows me to do things i wouldn't otherwise do, this time it just raised my insurance.

reference: hertwig, barron, weber, erev. decisions from experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice. psychological science, vol 15 no 8. aug. 2004

Labels: decision making

scientists have discovered a positive correlation between the amount of gray matter (ie somas, the bodies of neurons) in one's brain to his/her intelligence!

i wonder the impact of this study, if results are replicated and confirmed. finding such a direct link seems like it obviates the need for IQ tests in a way - MENSA can now recruit based on soma count. exclusive schools and competitive companies may someday make decisions in part based on your brain scan.

now we need to answer why some people have more gray matter and others have less, and if there's any way to increase that.

another fascinating outcome: it's related to gray matter levels all over the brain, not just in one particular "smart spot." so... intelligence is distributed, making it harder to damage, which is good news.

Labels: decision making, neuroscience

"the Platonic metaphor of the mind as a charioteer driving twin horses of reason and emotion is on the right track - except that cognition is a smart pony, and emotion a big elephant".

the new zeland news reports on neuroscientific studies trying to explain why humans, despite what economists say, behave irrationally sometimes (or, more than sometimes, as i've observed). the article states that economics is based on the fallacy that people behave rationally when making economic decisions. economists and behavioral scientists have been bickering about this for a while, but neuroscience may have something interesting to say about it.

first let me say in defense of economics: saying that economics is based on individual rational behavior is untrue - from my admittedly limited study of the subject it seems it's really the study of aggregate behavior, which does usually tend towards the rational laws economists espouse. individual behaviors are a different story. it's true that we all make decisions based on what we see as the costs and benefits of the outcome, but how accurately we can gauge that outcome in objective standards is another question entirely and should be the subject of it’s own post.

the nz reports on the classic study where person a gets $10 and has the option of giving some to person b. person b can accept or reject the gift. typically if person a offers only a dollar or two, person b rejects the gift, presumably because s/he’s offended. however that’s not usually how it happens – person a typically offers nearly half of what s/he’s given, and person b usually accepts it.

in the experiment, both person a and b have a clear understanding that what position they’re in is a result wholly of the turn of the die. that “a” has $10 and “b” none has nothing to do with hard work, only randomization on the part of the experimenter. i wonder how the results would change if there were a pre-game that distributed the money more meritocratically. or if person b was told that the $10 came straight out of person a’s pocket, and not the lab’s. this would give us a clearer picture of how these situations work in the “real world.”

i’d argue that perhaps taking that one dollar as opposed to rejecting the offer is not always the most rational choice anyway. there are things that people value more than one dollar, including pride. perhaps person “b” is in reality paying one dollar for the ability to hurt person “a”’s feelings like a did to him/her.

now about the neuroscience: when person b is offered only a few bucks, the insular cortex "lights up." ignoring my extreme skepticism about MRIs, this is not surprising. we think the insular cortex has to do with happiness/sadness (and a bunch of other things like memory and language). according to this study, the prefrontal “competes” with the insular cortex, and is the source of the rational impulse to take the low offer. the more “activated” the insular, the more likely to reject the offer, and the more “activated” the prefrontal, the more likely to accept.

does this mean that the insular cortex is related to emotional (and therefore objectively unwise) reactions and the prefrontal to more rational deliberation? maybe. it’s true the prefrontal cortex is thought to be involved in coordinating thoughts and actions in a goal-directed way. it’s also, interestingly enough, thought to be involved in impulse control and “forward thinking.” perhaps it’s the mature part of the brain.

more on this later i'm sure. it's a constant theme of economics and behavioral science.

Labels: decision making, neuroscience, well being